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Trimming 
 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
 
Abstract 
 
 
In law and politics, some people are trimmers. They attempt to steer between the poles. 
Trimming might be defended as a heuristic for what is right, as a means of reducing political 
conflict over especially controversial questions, or as a method of ensuring that people who hold 
competing positions are not humiliated, excluded, or hurt. There are two kinds of trimmers: 
compromisers, who follow a kind of “trimming heuristic” and thus conclude that the middle 
course is best; and preservers, who attempt to preserve what is deepest in and most essential to 
competing reasonable positions, which they are willing to scrutinize and evaluate. It is true that 
in some cases, trimming leads to bad results in both politics and law, including bad 
interpretations of the Constitution. It is also true that trimmers face difficult questions about how 
to ascertain the relevant extremes and that trimmers can be manipulated by those who are in a 
position to characterize or to shift those extremes. Nonetheless, trimming is an honorable 
approach to some difficult questions in both law and politics, and in many domains, it is more 
attractive than the alternatives. In constitutional law, there are illuminating conflicts among 
those who believe in trimming, minimalism, rights fundamentalism, and democratic primacy. 
 
 
 
Why, after we have played the foole with throwing Whig and Tory at one another, 
as boys do snowballs, doe we grow angry at a new name, which by its true signification 
might do as much to put us into our witts, as the others have been to put us out of them? 
The Innocent Word Trimmer signifieth no more than this, that if men are together in a 
Boat, and one part of the Company would weigh it down on one side, another would 
make it lean as much to the contrary, it happneth there is a third Opinion, of those who 
conceave it would do as well, if the Boat went even, without endangering the Passengers. 
. . . [T]rue Vertue hath ever been thought a Trimmer, and to have its dwelling in the 
middle, between the two extreams. 
 
-- Lord Halifax1 
 
                                                 
* Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Harry Kalven Visiting Professor of Law, 
University of Chicago Law School, January 2009. I am grateful to Bruce Ackerman, Glenn Cohen, Adam 
Cox, Elizabeth Emens, Richard Fallon, Terry Fisher, Robert Goodin, Jonathan Masur, Martha Minow, 
Gerry Newman, Martha Nussbaum, Eric Posner, Arden Rowell, Michael Sandel, Kathryn Spier, David 
Strauss, Mark Tushnet, and Adrian Vermeule for valuable comments on a previous draft. Participants in 
work-in-progress lunches at Harvard Law School and the University of Chicago Law School provided a 
great deal of help. I am also grateful to Beth Bell, Emily Ullman, and Deanna Rice for superb and 
indispensable research assistance.  
1 Lord Halifax, The Character of A Trimmer, in 1 The Works of George Savile Marquis of Halifax (Mark 
Brown ed. 1989). 
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These innumerable seekers of safety first, and last, who take no risk either of 
suffering in a good cause or of scandal in a bad one, are here manifestly, nakedly, that 
which they were in life, the waste and rubble of the universe, of no account to the world, 
unfit for Heaven and barely admitted to hell. They have no need to die, for they ‘never 
were alive.’ They follow still, as they always done, a meaningless, shifting banner that 
never stands for anything because it never stands at all, a cause which is no cause but the 
changing magnet of the day. Their pains are paltry and their tears and blood mere food for 
worms. 
 
-- John Sinclair, writing of 
Dante’s “Neutrals” or 
“Trimmers”2 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 It is easy to imagine three stylized rulings on the relationship between the First 
Amendment and libel law: 
 
1.  “The First Amendment creates a robust right to freedom of expression. The 
government may interfere with that right only on a compelling showing of 
necessity. With respect to public figures, no such showing can be made; the First 
Amendment flatly bans the use of libel law.” 
 
2. “The First Amendment protects freedom of speech. But that right is not properly 
understood to raise doubts about the common law of libel. So long as states are 
applying long-established common law, the First Amendment is not violated.” 
 
3. “The First Amendment protects freedom of speech. In this case, the application of 
libel law violates that freedom. We limit our conclusion to the particular facts. 
Other questions, involving the precise relationship between libel law and the First 
Amendment, need not be resolved here.” 
 
All three approaches are familiar from multiple domains of constitutional law. 
Recognizing a capacious individual right, the Court might pursue a course of rights 
fundamentalism. Rejecting such a right, and permitting governments to act as they see fit, 
the Court might decide in favor of democratic primacy. Or refusing to specify the nature 
and scope of the right, the Court might pursue a course of minimalism. Within the Court, 
and in the academic literature, a lively debate can be found about the choice among the 
three possible approaches.3 
                                                 
2 See comments of John Sinclair, Dante’s Inferno 49-50 (John Sinclair trans. 1961). 
3 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (2007); Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty (2006). 
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There is, however, a fourth approach. Imagine the following ruling: 
 
4. “The right to free speech does impose limitations on use of the law of libel, and 
the use at issue here is unconstitutional. But the free speech right extends only to 
situations A, B, and C; it does not include situations X, Y, and Z, and in the latter 
situations, libel law can be used.” In this ruling, the Court is quite specific about 
both A, B, and C and X, Y, and Z. 
 
This approach is distinctive, because it squarely rejects not only rights 
fundamentalism and democratic primacy, but also minimalism, on the ground that the 
Court should settle a large area of the law, and should not leave the fundamental 
questions undecided.4 
 
Oddly, there is no sustained discussion, within the Court or in the academic 
literature, of this fourth approach. Indeed, we lack a name for it. I shall use the term 
trimming. The term comes from the seventeenth century Trimmers, who tended to reject 
the extremes and to borrow ideas from both sides in intense social controversies.5 
Trimmers believed it important to steer between the polar positions and to preserve what 
is deepest and most sensible in competing positions.  
 
The idea of trimming has become a pejorative. No one marches proudly under the 
trimmers’ banner; no one feels delighted or honored to be called a trimmer. But I shall 
attempt to show that in many domains, including constitutional law, there are powerful 
arguments on behalf of trimming, and that in both law and politics, trimming should be 
taken not as an insult, but as a descriptive term for an approach that often has 
considerable appeal.6 Sometimes trimming is a heuristic for what is best; sometimes 
trimming can be defended as a means of ensuring that no one is excluded, humiliated, or 
hurt; sometimes trimming is an effort to identify and to preserve the best arguments and 
the deepest convictions on all sides; sometimes trimming helps to reduce social conflict 
and public outrage. My most ambitious goal is to reverse the valence of the idea of 
trimming, and to suggest that in important situations, reasonable practical, epistemic, and 
even moral claims can be offered on its behalf. 
                                                 
4 In fact the Court’s approach, in its seminal decision on libel law, was an unruly mixture of the first, third, 
and fourth approaches. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964). 
5 For historical treatments, see Donald B. Benson, Halifax and the Trimmers, 27 Huntington Library Q. 115 
(1964); H.C. Foxcroft, A Character of A Trimmer: Being a Short Life of the First Marquis of Halifax 
(1946); Thomas C. Faulkner, Halifax’s “The Character of A Trimmer” and L’Estrange’s Attack on 
Trimmers in The Obsevator, 37 Huntington Library Q. (1973); Mark C. Brown, Trimmers and Moderates 
in the Reign of Charles II, 37 Huntington Library Q. 311 (1974); Henry Horwitz, Parliament, Policy and 
Politics in the Reign of Willima III (1977). For a valuable discussion, see Eugene Goodheart, In Defense of 
Trimming, 25 Philosophy and Literature 46 (2001). 
6 See Goodheart, supra note. 
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II. Why Trimmers Trim 
 
Trimmers follow a particular method, one that requires close attention to all sides, 
including the poles. As a matter of procedure, contemporary trimmers, like their 
seventeenth-century predecessors, listen carefully to competing views and are reluctant to 
repudiate the intensely felt commitments of political or legal adversaries. As a matter of 
substance, contemporary trimmers, like their seventeenth-century predecessors, tend to 
end up between the extremes, in a way that makes both believe that they have gained, or 
not lost, something of importance. The trimmer’s instinct is to see what the other side has 
to say, and to explore whether something might be drawn from it, or preserved in it. As 
we will see, the trimmers avoid the extremes, but they reject minimalism; they do not 
bracket hard questions or attempt to leave them undecided. 
 
To understand trimming, it will be useful to begin with some brief historical 
notes. Though the original Trimmers have been largely lost in contemporary political and 
legal debates, we can learn a great deal from what they had to say.7  
 
A. Historical Notes 
 
The first mention of a “Trimmer” in print was in The Character of a Trimmer, 
neither Whigg nor Tory, anonymously published in 1682.8 The text was written by the 
most influential trimmer, George Savile, the Marquis of Halifax, who left public office in 
February 16909 and died in April 1695.10 After the publication of Lord Halifax’s essay, 
Trimmers were mentioned frequently in the popular press for the next three years and 
occasionally thereafter, until 1689.11 Trimmers appeared frequently in Roger 
L’Estrange’s widely read The Observator, in which political dialogues that had 
previously taken place between Whig and Tory were changed in November 1682 to be 
between a Trimmer and Observator.12 To L’Estrange, anyone who did not follow the 
strictest of Tory policies could be termed a Trimmer.13 He summarized the defining 
Trimmer characteristics as follows: 
 
Trim. And what Is a Trimmer at last?  
                                                 
7 See id. 
8 Donald R. Benson, Halifax and the Trimmers, 27 HUNTINGTON LIBRARY Q. 115, 118 (1964).  
9 Mark N. Brown, Introduction to 1 THE WORKS OF GEORGE SAVILE MARQUIS OF HALIFAX 1, 147 (Mark 
N. Brown ed., 1989).  
10 H.C. FOXCROFT, A CHARACTER OF THE TRIMMER: BEING A SHORT LIFE OF THE FIRST MARQUIS OF 
HALIFAX 336 (1946).  
11 Id. at 131.  
12 Tim Harris, What’s New About the Restoration?, 29 ALBION: A QUARTERLY JOURNAL CONCERNED WITH 
BRITISH STUDIES 187, 211 (1997).  
13 Id. (quoting Observator, I, 242 (Nov. 16, 1682)).  
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Obs. Why a Trimmer is a Hundred Thousand Things; A Trimmer I tell ye, 
is a man of Latitude, as well in Politiques as Divinity: An Advocate, both 
for Liberty of Practice in the State, and for Liberty of Conscience in the 
Church.14  
 
Obs. But then you must Consider that there are Severall sorts of 
Trimmers; as your State-Trimmer, Your Law-Trimmer; Your Church-
Trimmer, Your Trading-Trimmer, &c.15 
 
As we shall see, an important point here is the suggestion that “there are Severall 
sorts of Trimmers”; the point applies in the twenty-first century no less than in the 
seventeenth. Others characterized Trimmers variously as non-conformists who went to 
church, those who were not sufficiently in favor of punishing Protestant Dissenters, the 
more moderate sort of Tories, or “secret Whigs.”16   
 
Notwithstanding the frequent and explicit references to Trimmers in the period, 
historians continue to debate the existence of an actual group of thinkers and officials 
who deserved the label. In the first half of the twentieth century, historians assumed that 
there was and that it was led by Halifax; even the Oxford English Dictionary gave the 
definition of “Trimmer” as “Lord Halifax and those associated with him (1680–1690).”17 
In the 1960s and 1970s, however, some scholars began to question whether Halifax was 
associated with the Trimmer movement during his lifetime, and even to doubt whether 
there was an actual Trimmer movement with which to be associated. According to a 
prominent essay in 1964, “[t]he pamphlets of the Trimmer controversy give no indication 
that Halifax was identified in any way with the Trimmers during the period. He is not 
mentioned in the controversy by name or, apparently, by implication.”18 On this view, “it 
seems unlikely that a Trimmer party was ever more than a fiction of political 
controversy.”19  
 
By contrast, a more recent treatment argues that many moderate politicians and 
clergymen were called Trimmers: “Trimmers, therefore, were Tories accused of 
sympathy toward the Whigs or Anglicans similarly accused with respect to Protestant 
Dissenters. As most Anglicans were Tories, these two definitions are complementary, 
                                                 
14 Thomas C. Faulkner, Halifax's “The Character of a Trimmer” and L'Estrange's Attack on Trimmers in 
“The Observator” 37 HUNTINGTON LIBRARY Q. 71, 76 (1973) (quoting Observator, II, 177 (Dec. 3, 1684)).  
15 Id. (quoting Observator, I, 242 (Nov. 16, 1682)).  
16 Harris, supra note, at 212.  
17 Benson, supra note, at 116 (quoting The Oxford English Dictionary); see also id. 
18 Id. at 132.  
19 Id. at 134.  
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indeed almost interchangeable.”20 On this view, political Trimmers included those Tories, 
including Halifax and Lord Keeper Guilford, who believed in subjecting the Crown to the 
rule of law—moderate or constitutional Tories, as opposed to the “high-flying” Tories 
who believed in the king’s absolute power.21 
 
Whatever we make of the controversy, Lord Halifax was indeed a self-identified 
Trimmer, who argued for “dwelling in the middle, between two extreams.”22 Halifax 
rejected the fixed positions of both Tories and Whigs; he believed that the government 
should make a place both for royal authority and for a strong parliament. He wondered: 
“Why do angry men aile to rayle so against Moderation? Doth it not looke as they were 
going to some very scurvy Extream, that is too strong to be digested by the more 
considering part of mankind?”23 
 
For Trimmers, moderation is a signal virtue, and it entails a sympathetic 
understanding of what is best in and least dispensable to the “extreams.”24 In politics, 
Halifax favored a balance between the monarchy and the commonwealth, urging that the 
monarch must be constrained by law, that a constitutional order should protect civil 
liberties, and that parliaments should play a large role.25 The Trimmer is especially 
enthusiastic about the law, seeing legal rules as “the Chaines that tye up our unruly 
passions . . . .”26 In religion, Halifax sought “a mutuall Calmnesse of mind” between 
Protestants and Catholics, “overlooking of all veniall faults . . . .”27 With respect to 
longstanding social divisions, the Trimmer “is not eager to pick out the sore places in 
History against this or any other party; on the contrary, is very solicitious to find out any 
thing that may be healing, and tend to an agreement . . . .”28  
 
As the Revolution of 1688 developed, Halifax insisted on maintaining contacts 
with both sides.29 William III, who ascended the throne as a result of the Revolution, 
practiced what he called Trimming by including both Whigs and Tories in government, 
and he often said that he wanted to “go upon the bottom of the trimmers or [be] the 
middle party.”30 In an important effort to rehabilitate Halifax, Macauley wrote with 
                                                 
20 Mark N. Brown, Trimmers and Moderates in the Reign of Charles II, 37 HUNTINGTON LIBRARY Q. 311, 
319 (1974).  
21 Id. at 328–30.  
22 See Halifax, supra note, at 243. 
23 Id. at 240. 
24 Id. at 243. 
25 Id. at 184-198. 
26 Id. at 180. 
27 Id. at 222.  
28 Id. at 223. 
29 Brown, supra note, at 111.  
30 Horwitz, supra note, at 35. 
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evident sympathy that “He had nothing in common with those who fly from extreme to 
extreme and regard the party which they have deserted with an animosity far exceeding 
that of consistent enemies. His place was on the debatable ground between the hostile 
divisions of the community.”31 In Mccauley’s account, Halifax “was therefore always 
severe upon his violent associates, and was always in friendly relations with his moderate 
opponents. Every faction in the day of its insolent and vindicate triumph occurred his 
censure; and every faction, when vanquished and persecuted, found in him a protector.”32 
As we shall see, this conception of Halifax has close parallels in the approach to law and 
politics that I mean to describe here. 
 
My goal here, however, is not one of intellectual biography or historical recovery. 
For purposes of contemporary law and politics, we can obtain inspiration from Halifax 
and his associates, but trimming is not be made, not found. The initial task is to show 
exactly why those in constitutional law (and perhaps elsewhere) might choose to trim. To 
undertake that task, we must begin by distinguishing between two kinds of trimmers. 
 
B. Compromisers, Preservers, and Moderates 
 
1. Two kinds of trimmers. Some trimmers are compromisers. They identify the 
extremes and they attempt to steer between them. Seeking to reduce social conflict, 
attempting to avoid public outrage, and believing that the middle position is 
presumptively best, compromisers try to give something to both sides. Other trimmers are 
preservers. They attempt to identify and to preserve what is most essential, deepest, most 
intensely felt, and most valuable in the competing views. Seeking to learn from those 
views, such trimmers give sympathetic scrutiny to apparent antagonists and seek to 
vindicate what is most appealing in their positions.  
 
No one disagree with the claim that it is important to listen to people to see if they 
have a point. What makes preservers distinctive is that they insist on identifying what is 
most reasonable in competing positions, with a particular desire to ensure that, to the 
extent possible, no one is, or feels, rejected or repudiated. It is thus important to see that 
preservers care both about judgments that are actually most essential (in their 
independent judgment) and also about judgments that are most deeply felt (in the 
subjective views of the antagonists). These different emphases may of course press in 
different directions; preservers who emphasize what is most essential might not end up in 
the same position as preservers who emphasize what is most intensely felt.33 At first 
                                                 
31 Thomas Babington Macaulay, The History of England 227 (1848).  
32 Id. 
33 The choice between the emphases will depend on why trimmers trim. See below, stressing that trimming 
might produce the best result in principle (a point that suggests that trimmers must make an independent 
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glance, preservative trimming seems attractive or at least plausible. It is not so easy to 
identify a principled argument for compromising as such (though I will try). 
 
We can understand trimming as either a characteristic or an activity.34 Some 
people, including some judges, are trimmers by general inclination. Confronted with a 
difficult problem about free speech or sex equality, they seek to trim. Other people, 
including other judges, trim on some occasions but not on others; they insist that 
trimming is unsuitable in many domains. They are not trimmers by nature. They might be 
inclined to trim in the context of an affirmative action dispute, but refuse to do in the 
context of a debate over regulation of political speech, perhaps concluding that a form of 
rights fundamentalism is desirable in that area. 
 
In constitutional law, trimming is pervasive, but it is not always clear whether 
particular trimmers are compromisers or preservers. Consider the debate over commercial 
speech. Some rights fundamentalists are inclined to give such speech the same protection 
as political speech, on the theory that respect for personal autonomy calls for such 
protection.35 By contrast, those who believe in democratic primacy reject the idea that 
commercial speech should receive any constitutional protection at all.36 In the midst of 
this debate, trimmers would be inclined to give some protection to commercial 
advertising, but less than they would give to political speech. This approach might be 
taken as a compromise between competing positions that are intensely held by apparently 
reasonable people. Alternatively, trimmers might believe that they are preserving what is 
best and most sensible in the competing positions. They might acknowledge that respect 
for autonomy calls for protection of truthful commercial speech, but also concede that 
there is far less reason to fear regulation of false or misleading commercial speech than 
regulation of false or misleading political speech.37 For this reason, they trim. 
 
Or consider the modern debate over substantive due process.38 Rights 
fundamentalists would authorize judges to give substantive content to the idea of 
“liberty” through their own moral judgments about that broad concept.39 By contrast, 
believers in democratic primacy would like to abandon substantive due process 
                                                                                                                                                 
judgments) and also the possibility that trimming will moderate social conflict (a point that suggest that 
trimmers should attend to the positions that are most deeply felt). 
34 I am grateful to Richard Fallon for pressing this distinction. 
35 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 US 484, 612 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
36 See Virginia State Bd of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 US 484, 512 (1976) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
37 See, e.g., id; Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 US 476 (1995). 
38 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558 (2003). 
39 Cf. Dworkin, supra note. 
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altogether.40 Rejecting both positions, trimmers believe that the scope of individual rights 
should be defined by reference to traditions.41 Due process traditionalists steer between 
the extremes. Some of those who take this approach are likely to be compromisers, 
thinking (for strategic or other reasons) that their approach is the best that is feasible. On 
this view, due process traditionalism is a second-best, adopted because the preferred 
approach is unavailable. Other due process traditionalists are preservers: They attempt to 
discern what is least indispensable, and most legitimate, about competing views. They 
trim not to split the difference, but to capture the most plausible convictions of the 
apparent adversaries. Of course it is an open question whether they have succeeded. 
 
Compromisers and preservers can be found in many other domains. Consider, for 
example, the views that while campaign contributions can be regulated consistently with 
the First Amendment, campaign expenditures are immune from regulation42; that 
restrictions on abortion are justified only if they do not amount to an “undue burden”43 
(suitably specified); that discrimination on the basis of sex is subject to intermediate 
scrutiny44; that obscenity is protected unless it runs afoul of a test that pays close 
attention to community standards and social values45; and that the constitutionality of 
public displays of the Ten Commandments depends on the context.46 In some of these 
cases, the prevailing view might be an effort to steer a middle course. In others, the 
prevailing view may be a product of a principled belief that trimming recognizes, and 
make space for, the most legitimate claims of the competing sides.  
 
It is important to distinguish here between trimmers about particular issues and 
trimmers about large questions about interpretation. A dispute about the equal protection 
clause or the Commander-in-Chief power might be solved via trimming; the same might 
be true about a dispute over originalism. Confronted with a disagreement between 
originalists and their critics, a trimmer might conclude not that the original understanding 
is determinative, but that it is entitled to consideration, and that when precedents do not 
cut the other way, it should be followed. Trimmers might be inclined to accept a form of 
“soft originalism,” giving weight to the original understanding without being bound by it. 
Questions of method and interpretation, no less than particular disputes, might be settled 
by a form of trimming.  
 
                                                 
40 See Lochner v. New York, 198 US 45 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Of course a rejection of 
substantive due process might be based on multiple grounds, including textual and historical ones. 
41 See Lawrence, supra note, 539 US at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 US 505 
(1989). 
42 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976). 
43 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 US 833 (1992). 
44 Craig v. Boren, 429 US 190 (1976). 
45 Miller v California, 413 US 15 (1973). 
46 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 US 677 (2005). 
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We can also identify forms of trimming that are internal to particular schools of 
interpretation. A committed originalist might refuse to trim as between originalism and 
the alternatives, but if committed originalists disagree on the proper interpretation of the 
Second Amendment or the Commander-in-Chief Clause, the originalist might respond to 
the disagreement with a form of trimming.47 Those who believe that the meaning of the 
Equal Protection Clause depends, in part, on contemporary moral judgments will not 
follow the original understanding (narrowly conceived) of the clause, but if there is a 
reasonable dispute about contemporary moral judgments, such judges might trim. Rights 
fundamentalists must decide exactly how fundamentalist to be; if there is an internal 
debate on that question, they might trim. Return to the relationship between free speech 
and libel; one rights fundamentalist might conclude that libel law cannot be used by 
public figures, while another might conclude that libel law cannot be used at all, and as 
between the two positions, it would be possible to trim. Those who believe in democratic 
primacy are inclined to uphold legislation against constitutional attack; but they too will 
confront hard cases under their own framework, and in responding to such cases, they 
might trim. 
 
2. Problems and concerns. From all of these examples, it should also be clear that 
what counts as the best form of trimming, and what qualify as the poles between which 
trimmers will steer, will not always be self-evident. Trimmers might strenuously disagree 
with one another about the proper way to trim; two or more approaches might 
legitimately count as trimming. In a dispute about the constitutional protection to be 
given to false statements about public figures, for example, many possible views could be 
deemed to be trimming, because there is a wide range of options between (say) the view 
that the Constitution allows states to control false statements as they see fit and (say) the 
view that the Constitution protects all statements about public figures.48 And what are the 
poles that interest trimmers? Rights fundamentalists and believers in democratic primacy 
might deliberately stake out quite extreme positions with the goal of moving trimmers in 
various directions. If influential leaders say that members of a religious group should be 
exterminated, and other leaders say that such people let alone, we would not admire 
trimmers who conclude that members of that religious group should be allowed to live so 
long as they are incarcerated.  
 
It would seem to follow that sensible trimmers should be prepared to evaluate, 
and not simply to observe, the competing positions—a view that will lead from 
compromise to preservation. It might also seem to follow that nearly any position could 
                                                 
47 On some issues, District of Columbia v. Heller, US (2008), adopts what might be seen as a form of 
originalist trimming. See id at (suggesting limits on the Second Amendment right). 
48 For a spectrum of possible views, see New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964). 
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be characterized as trimming, because any position is likely to be between at least some 
imaginable poles. I will return to these problems below. 
 
3. Moderates vs. trimmers. It is important to distinguish between ideological 
moderates and trimmers, even though it will not always be easy to tell them apart in 
practice, and even though they will often agree. Moderates might simply believe that 
commercial speech is entitled to some protection, but less so than political speech. 
Moderates might hold this position in a social vacuum; this happens to be their preferred 
interpretation of the Constitution, one that makes them moderates under current 
conditions. Such moderates are not trimmers, because they do not follow the trimmers’ 
decision procedure, do not much care about the competing positions, and are not trying to 
steer between them. They are neither compromisers nor preservers. They might well 
refuse to compromise with others or lack interest in careful investigation of polar 
positions to preserve what is deepest and best in them. For moderates, it might not be 
especially important to ensure that no one is humiliated or hurt. But some moderates 
might also turn out to be trimmers; for example, they might compromise by choosing to 
sign onto an opinion that takes a position halfway between their moderate position and 
that of one of the extremists. 
 
C. Five Reasons to Trim 
 
Why would anyone want to trim? We could imagine five reasons. Some of these 
will appeal to compromisers; others will be invoked by preservers; still others will appeal 
to both.  
 
1. Trimming as best in principle. After sympathetic investigation of the 
contending positions, a judge might conclude that the best interpretation of the relevant 
materials calls for steering between the poles. Perhaps such a judge believes, with Justice 
Powell, that the Constitution requires government to produce strong justifications for any 
race-conscious program, that rigid quota systems are unacceptable, but that in identifiable 
circumstances in which race is treated as a mere “factor,” those justifications are 
available.49 A judge of this kind would produce a form of constitutional trimming for the 
affirmative action debate. Indeed, the Court has taken exactly this approach in that 
domain; affirmative action is an area in which trimming reigns triumphant.50  
 
In the same way, a constitutional trimmer might believe that the equal protection 
clause is not properly read to require courts to treat sex discrimination as skeptically as 
they treat race discrimination, but that both forms of discrimination should face serious 
                                                 
49 Regents of the University of California v Bakke, 438 US 265 (1978). 
50 Grutter v Bollinger, 539 US 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 US 244 (2003). 
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judicial scrutiny.51 Those who are drawn to this view might trim with the conclusion that 
the government is permitted to engage in some forms of sex discrimination even if it is 
flatly forbidden from drawing racial lines.52 Judges who reach this conclusion might be 
moderates rather than trimmers, but we could certainly imagine preservers and even 
compromisers who end up with this conclusion. A preserver might believe that those who 
attack sex discrimination are correct to insist that that form of discrimination is usually 
based on the same kinds of constitutionally illicit motivations that produce racial 
discrimination -- but that on admittedly rare occasions, those who defend sex 
discrimination are able to generate sufficiently reasonable justifications for their 
actions.53 
 
2. The trimming heuristic—and the epistemic case for trimming. A humble judge 
might believe that trimming is a kind of heuristic for what is right. It is here that we can 
understand why some trimmers are compromisers. Consider the fact that human beings 
typically demonstrate “extremeness aversion.”54 Confronted with several options (such as 
radios or dinner selections on a menu) and having incomplete information, many people 
tend to avoid the poles.55 Indeed, jurors themselves have been found to trim, in the sense 
that they steer between the extremes; for this reason, the prosecutor’s selection of 
criminal counts can greatly matter of what the jury ends up doing.56  
 
At first glance, people’s tendencies here might seem puzzling, but under certain 
assumptions, extremeness aversion is perfectly rational, because it reflects a sensible 
heuristic, above all for those who are unsure how to proceed. Suppose, for example, that 
a politician is confronted with a problem for which some intelligent people urge one 
extreme course (say, no increase in the minimum wage), and other intelligent people urge 
another extreme course (say, a $2 increase in the minimum wage). If the politician is not 
sure which position is right, she might choose to trim, with the thought that the truth 
probably lies in between.  
 
In this light, trimming might even have epistemic credentials. Under plausible 
assumptions about the set of judgments that surround the trimmer, the trimming result is 
likely to be best,57 because it reflects “the wisdom of crowds.”58 The Condorcet Jury 
                                                 
51 Craig v Boren, 429 US 190 (1976). 
52 Id. 
53 See, as controversial but possible examples, Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 US 464 (1981); Rostker 
v. Goldberg, 453 US 57 (1981). 
54 See Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision-Making, 25 J Legal Stud 287 (1996). 
55 Id. 
56 Id.  
57 For some theoretical reasons to think that trimmers might be right on this count, see Scott Page, The 
Difference (2007). 
58 See James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds (2005). 
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Theorem shows that if people are better than random guessers, the likelihood that the 
majority view will be correct increases to 100 percent as the size of the group expands.59 
The Jury Theorem helps to explain the fact that in large groups, the average view or 
estimate is remarkably accurate.60 In this light, trimming might be defended on epistemic 
grounds. Suppose that there is a distribution of views on the relevant question. A judge 
who is unsure might choose the average position, on the ground that it is most likely to be 
right. On legal questions, compromising seems arbitrary, but it can claim a genuine 
epistemic logic, at least if we are able to agree that there are right answers to legal 
questions.61  
 
Perhaps a judge who is disposed to compromise will have the further thought that 
by trimming, she can avoid the most serious dangers associated with both of the 
extremes. A risk-averse judge might select trimming if both sides are able to make serious 
complaints about the hazards that would accompany the course suggested by the other. 
For those who believe that for contested issues, moderation is usually wiser, less 
dangerous, or both, trimming makes a great deal of sense. 
 
Those who adopt the “trimming heuristic” might be either compromisers or 
preservers. They might not have the time or the capacity to think carefully about which 
position is right, or having thought carefully, they might not be sure. If so, trimming 
might seem to be the prudent course. If they are preservers, trimmers will also ask: On 
both sides, what commitments are most attractive, or most deeply held, or essential? 
Return to the context of affirmative action in education, where trimmers might accept two 
propositions. (a) Those who reject affirmative action have given good reasons for their 
opposition, on constitutional grounds, to rigid quota systems, which fundamentally deny 
equal treatment. (b) Those who favor affirmative action argue, plausibly, that a university 
might legitimately seek to obtain a racially diverse student body. Perhaps the 
commitments of both sides can be preserved by a decision that rejects any kind of reject 
quota system but that allows race to be considered “as a factor.”62 
 
3. Strategic trimming. A more confident judge might trim for purely strategic 
reasons. Suppose, for example, that a judge believes that affirmative action is always 
unconstitutional or that the Constitution does not protect a right to privacy. Such a judge 
is not moderate, but she might conclude that other judges cannot be persuaded to accept 
this position. Trimming might be an indispensable method for building a majority on 
behalf of the best outcome that is realistically possible.  
                                                 
59 See Cass R. Sunstein, Infotopia (2006). 
60 See id. 
61 On this point, see Cass R. Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Minds (forthcoming 2009). 
62 Grutter v Bollinger, 539 US 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 US 244 (2003). 
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Here, then, we can find a ground for trimming as a form of (strategic) 
compromise. The strategic trimmer is trying to obtain the best available result in light of 
constraints produced by practical realities on a multimember court. Coalitions are 
possible here between moderates, principled trimmers, and their strategic siblings: Some 
judges may believe that trimming leads to the best result, while others sign on because 
trimming is the best that they can get. 
 
4. Trimming and precedent. A judge might believe that trimming is the only way 
to proceed while respecting the requirements of stare decisis. Both compromisers and 
preservers might accept this proposition. Indeed, a system based on precedent is likely to 
produce a doctrine that is replete with (what some observers will see as) a kind of 
trimming. Suppose that a judge believes that as a matter of principle, it would be best if 
the first amendment were not understood to protect commercial advertising at all, or if 
the due process clause were not taken to have a substantive component or to create a right 
to privacy. Confronted with unwelcome precedents, the judge might attempt to limit the 
protection of commercial advertising to truthful and nondeceptive practices, or might 
conclude that the substantive component of the due process clause should be limited to 
those rights, including privacy rights, that are sanctified by tradition. For judges who are 
drawn to either rights fundamentalism or democratic primacy, a form of trimming might 
well be inevitable so long as precedents are respected. Judges of this kind might hope to 
move the law, by degrees, in their preferred directions, but they will have to settle for a 
high degree of trimming. 
 
 We should make a distinction here between (a) intentional trimming by self-
conscious trimmers and (b) doctrine that appears to be a product of (a), but that is 
actually an outcome of an invisible hand process, in which a regime of trimming appears 
to be the product of a single trimming mind, but is nothing of the kind.63 Consider, for 
example, the domain of constitutional takings, which seems to have a great deal of 
trimming.64 It is reasonable to suggest that existing doctrine was not a product of the 
decisions of self-conscious trimmers, but instead evolved through case-by-case 
judgments joined by many people who would have preferred a different kind of regime. 
 
We should also note that those who accept precedent, and who trim for that 
reason, are not motivated by a concern to ensure that people are not distressed or 
humiliated. Many of those who respect precedent would resist the claim that they are 
trimmers. The only point if that precedent-respecting judges produce outcomes that they 
                                                 
63 For a superb discussion of invisible hand mechanisms, see Edna Ullmann-Margalit, The Invisible Hand 
and the Cunning of Reason, 64 Social Research 181 (1997). 
64 Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003 (1992); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. 
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 US 302 (2002); Lingle v. Chevron, USA, 544 US 528 (2005). 
  
 15
would not choose if they are writing on a clean slate, and in an important sense, they 
show respect to those with whom they disagree. 
 
5. Social conflict, social exclusion, humiliation, and trimming. A judge might not 
know which result is best, and might trim for external reasons, having to do with the 
public reaction to the Court’s decision. The trimmer might seek to minimize social 
conflict and might conclude that trimming is the best way of accomplishing that task. A 
trimming judge might be particularly concerned about public outrage, in the form of 
intense objections on the part of identifiable segments of the public.65 The trimmer might 
believe: If the Court rejects an individual right to own guns, its decision will cause 
polarization and agitation, and perhaps have a large public impact, conceivably even 
affecting the result of presidential campaigns. Alert to the harmful consequences of 
certain rulings, a trimmer might be seeking to minimize the damage. Or the trimmer 
might think: If the public would be outraged by one or another decision, perhaps that 
decision is wrong; the intensely held beliefs of the public offer some clues about what 
decisions would be wrong or right.66 If rights fundamentalism or democratic primacy 
would create a significant public reaction, the Court might decide to trim on either 
consequentialist or epistemic grounds. 
 
It is true that those who are concerned about social conflict and public outrage are 
most likely to support not trimming but two alternative approaches: use of the “passive 
virtues,”67 enabling the Court to decline to resolve certain cases at all, or minimalism, in 
which the Court decides cases while leaving key issues undecided.68 If public outrage is 
the fear, trimming seems inferior to any approach that simply brackets the hardest 
questions and leaves them for another day. But if bracketing turns out to be impossible or 
for some reason undesirable,69 a judge might reasonably attempt to trim. If it is possible 
to reach a resolution that is reasonable, or right enough, the judge might seek an outcome 
that does not cause intense public controversy. 
 
To that extent that public outrage is their motivation, trimmers might be accused 
of being weak, passive, or cowardly. Return in this regard to my first epigraph: “They 
follow still, as they always done, a meaningless, shifting banner that never stands for 
anything because it never stands at all, a cause which is no cause but the changing 
magnet of the day.”70 In some contexts, the accusation is warranted. But trimming can 
                                                 
65 See Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Decisions, Should Judges Care?, 60 Stan L 
Rev 155 (2007). 
66 See id. 
67 See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1965). 
68 See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case At A Time (1999). 
69 See infra for some explanatory comments on this point. 
70 See note supra. 
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also be understood to have moral foundations, captured in the idea that people should be 
respected and included, and should be neither humiliated nor hurt. When trimmers 
attempt to take on board the deepest commitments of legal or political adversaries, they 
are attempt to show respect to all sides—and to ensure that no side feels offended, 
diminished, or aggrieved. In some ways, it is here that we can locate the independent 
moral grounds for trimming. 
 
Consider in this light recent findings of “cultural cognition,” a term that is meant 
to point to the existence of competing foundations for legal and political analysis; those 
foundations lead to disparate judgments about particular problems.71 Trimmers hope to 
reach results that can be accepted or at least not strenuously rejected by people who have 
different foundational commitments. The hope is that trimming can obtain support for 
people from different “cultures.” Of course judicial rulings will inevitably offend some 
people, and judges should not trim simply to avoid offense. In striking down school 
segregation, the Court did not trim.72 But if judges can rule in a way that makes people 
feel respected rather than ridiculed, they should do so; and trimming might be their best 
option on that score. 
 
There is a broader point. Insofar as trimmers pay close attention to the views of 
others, the practice of trimming is part of a large category of cases in which human 
beings decide on the basis of what others think.73 It would be possible, for example, to 
follow trusted others, as, for example, where people believe that particular litigants or 
particular justices (Justice Breyer? Justice Scalia?) are generally right, and should be 
followed for that reason. This kind of approach would lead to very different outcomes 
from trimming, but it is in the same family. So too, it would be possible to think that the 
best approach is to identify a view that is held by some person or community, and to take 
a somewhat more extreme view than is held by that person or community. There are 
many imaginable variations on this theme. If the views of other people provide a sensible 
basis for making up one’s own mind, trimming is merely a member of a large family of 
possible approaches. 
 
III. Against Trimming 
 
Thus defended, trimming runs into five serious objections. First and most 
fundamentally, trimmers might blunder. This risk seems especially serious in 
constitutional law, where judges owe a duty of fidelity to the founding document. Second, 
                                                 
71 See, e.g., Dan Kahan and Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 Yale Law and 
Policy Review 147 (2006). 
72 Brown v. Bd. Of Educ., 347 US 483 (1954). 
73 See the discussion of the “do what the majority do” heuristic in Gerd Gigerenzer, Gut Feelings (2007). 
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trimmers may have a hard time specifying the relevant poles. Third, trimmers are 
manipulable and their decisions are potentially arbitrary; strategic actors can move or 
characterize the poles in a way that presses trimmers in their preferred directions. Fourth, 
trimmers take account of considerations that may turn out to be irrelevant in principle. 
Fifth, it might be thought that trimming is for politicians, not for judges. 
 
A. Blundering Trimmers 
 
The Supreme Court’s most important obligation is to interpret the founding 
document correctly. Much of the time, trimming will violate that obligation. Why—it 
might be asked -- should judges believe that trimming will yield the correct 
interpretation? (Similar questions could be asked of those involved in politics.) 
 
This question could be pressed with equal vigor by skeptics armed by competing 
accounts of constitutional interpretation. Some people are originalists; they believe that 
the original understanding of the Constitution settles the document’s current meaning.74 
Originalists might well believe that trimming will yield bad interpretations. In their view, 
judges should not trim; they should construe the founding document consistently with the 
original understanding.75 Other people believe that judges should uphold legislative 
enactments unless the violation of the Constitution is plain.76 Trimming will often violate 
this injunction, because it will lead to invalidations when the violation is far from plain.  
 
Still other people believe that the Constitution should be given a “moral reading,” 
in the sense that judges should invest the document with the best moral principles, 
consistent with precedent.77 In many cases, trimming will produce an inferior moral 
reading. Those who seek moral readers will ask: Why should judges split the difference, 
rather than interpreting the disputed provisions in the morally preferred way? With 
respect to constitutional law, some people are visionaries; they believe that the document, 
properly interpreted, calls for significant social change. Outside of constitutional law, 
visionaries have played an unmistakably large role in American history. Trimmers seem 
to be an obstacle to desirable change. And whatever our preferred account of 
constitutional interpretation, we can readily find disputes in which trimming would be 
unacceptable.  
 
In politics, the problem is not obscure. If some people say that all suspected 
terrorists should be tortured, and other people say that no one should be tortured, we 
                                                 
74 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (1998). 
75 Thus, for example, District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), perhaps the most self-consciously originalist 
opinion in the Court’s history, is not fundamentally a form of trimming. 
76 See Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty (2006). 
77 See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law (1997). 
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might not be enthusiastic about the view that half of suspected terrorists should be 
tortured. Suppose, for example, that a judge is presented with these alternatives: (a) Strike 
down school segregation in all circumstances. (b) Never strike down school segregation. 
(c) Strike down school segregation only when racial separation is demonstrably unequal. 
The trimming solution is (c), but (a) is clearly preferable. It would not have been right for 
the Court to choose (c), even though reasonable people disputed the constitutional 
question and even though (a) left many segregations feeling humiliated and not treated 
with respect.78 Or suppose that the alternatives are these. (a) Interpret the First 
Amendment to allow state and federal governments to ban speech that they reasonably 
believe to be dangerous.79 (c) Interpret the First Amendment to allow the national 
government to ban speech only on a showing of a “clear and present danger,” but to allow 
state governments to ban speech that they reasonably believe to be dangerous. (c) Allow 
state and federal governments to ban speech only on a showing of a “clear and present 
danger.” The trimming solution is (b), but (c) is far better.80  
 
The examples could easily be multiplied. They show that trimming is 
unacceptable when it produces an incorrect or implausible interpretation of the 
Constitution.81 
 
B. Confused Trimmers 
 
What are the extremes that concern trimmers? And what, exactly, is the solution 
that counts as trimming? Mightn’t many solutions qualify? So long as judges are sane, it 
might seem inevitable that they will trim, in the sense that they will steer between 
imaginable poles. In this light, how can we know whether judges are trimming?  
 
On a multimember court, we should begin with the suggestion that the relevant 
judges determine the extremes. If two judges are to the far left (on the tribunal), and if 
two are to the far right (same parenthetical), then the conscientious trimmer can start to 
find his bearings. This possibility demonstrates that no court could consist solely of 
trimmers. The reason is that if all judges are trimmers, then none will be able to find his 
place; the very practice of trimming depends on a number of actors who are not trimmers 
at all. Trimmers inevitably operate as free-riders, reaching their conclusions on the basis 
                                                 
78 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 US 294 (1955), or Brown II, with its “all deliberate speed” formula, can 
easily be understood as a form of trimming, one that recognized both practical realities and intensely felt 
beliefs on all sides. But it is not at all clear that the Court’s approach was defensible for that reason. See 
Charles Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 Wash L Rev 3, 22 (1970). 
79 See Debs v. US, 249 US 211 (1919). 
80 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969). 
81 Cf. Robert Kennedy, Foreword, Profiles in Courage: “President Kennedy was fond of quoting Dante that 
‘the hottest places in Hell are reserved for those who, in a time of great moral crisis, maintain their 
neutrality.’” 
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of others’ judgments. Notwithstanding this point, there is a certain logic, at least on the 
Supreme Court, in focusing on the distribution of views on the tribunal. Suppose that the 
trimmer believes that those views reflect something important about the relevant 
distribution of views within the community. Perhaps justices are selected in a way that 
ensures representation of reasonable positions among specialists. If so, the tribunal is 
hardly an arbitrary source of relevant points of view. 
 
It is not entirely clear, however, that judicial trimmers should focus on their 
tribunal. Suppose that the court is to the right or the left of the nation, so that the 
distribution of opinions, within that court, is skewed compared to the distribution of 
opinions within the nation at large. Perhaps the trimmer should look to society as a 
whole, not to the judiciary. Or suppose that the court is to the right of where it was twenty 
years ago, and the trimmer believes that the relevant extremes are identified by the range 
of views in a previous era. Should the trimmer work on the basis of the contemporary 
range, rather than an earlier one—or should the trimmer think about the range of views 
that is likely to prevail in (say) a decade? 
 
The answers to such questions will depend on why, exactly, the trimmer trims, 
and also on the distinction between compromisers and preservers. If trimmers seek to 
diminish public outrage and social conflict, they are likely to look to the range of views 
in society, not on the court. If the trimmers trim because trimming is a good heuristic, and 
has epistemic credentials, the choice between the tribunal and the public depends on the 
relevant theory of interpretation. Suppose that the trimmer thinks that constitutional law 
turns on a mix of pertinent considerations, including the original understanding, 
precedents, democratic theory, and moral argument. If so, the views of the public may not 
be especially relevant; what matters is the distribution of views within the group of 
people who are entrusted with interpreting the Constitution, and who have relevant 
expertise. Even if a trimmer is a compromiser, the relevant compromise might involve the 
Court itself—at least if social conflict and public outrage are not the central 
considerations.  
 
These points help to answer another question: Isn’t any sane position a form of 
trimming? At first glance, Brown v. Bd. of Education does not appear to count as 
trimming, because the Court invalidated “separate but equal” across the board. But 
perhaps Brown trimmed after all, because the Court did not adopt a more aggressive 
principle that would (for example) doom facially neutral laws with discriminatory 
consequences, or that would mandate affirmative action. Nonetheless, it is false, a kind of 
debaters’ point, to say that any position can count as trimming. What is relevant is the 
range of arguments made to the Court. With respect to those arguments, Brown did not 
trim. By contrast, Brown II, with its “all deliberate speed” formula, was indeed a form of 
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trimming. Trimming is always relative to the relevant range of arguments, and these are 
determined by asking what, exactly, people have to say.  
 
It is true, however, that in many cases, more than one position can be counted as a 
form of trimming. In the context of a debate over free speech or the right to privacy, we 
could imagine a crude “civil liberties scale” of –10 to +10, and we could imagine 
arguments –10, –5, 0, –5, and 10. The trimmer can legitimately choose –5, 0, and +5. The 
committed compromiser will be inclined to 0, but legal arguments may not quite line up 
in so orderly a way, and perhaps 0 make no sense. At this point it must be conceded that 
if a judge is inclined to trim, she has an inclination, but without some investigation, she 
will not know exactly what she should do. Of course the same points apply to rights 
fundamentalism, democratic primacy, and minimalism; these too are general inclinations 
that must be specified. For example, minimalists, no less than trimmers, will have a range 
of options that are consistent with their method. 
 
C. Manipulable Trimmers 
 
1. The problem. For both compromisers and preservers, what count as the 
extremes, and hence what counts as trimming, depends on the alternatives that are 
presented. As Robert Goodin has objected, a procedure of the trimmers’ kind “is 
outrageously sensitive to the choice of endpoints. Tack Aquinas onto the one end or De 
Sade onto the other and the midpoint shifts wildly.”82 
 
The point is familiar in marketing: Self-interested sellers can exploit extremeness 
aversion in order to press people in their preferred directions. For example, they might 
introduce very high-cost items that make a relatively high-cost item seem to be the 
compromise choice.83 Alert to extremeness aversion and intent on obtaining a conviction, 
prosecutors can do the same thing, identifying an especially severe count as a way of 
ensuring a conviction on a less severe one.84 The upshot is that trimmers can be 
manipulated by those who select or identify the range of options. Indeed, their own 
positions might turn out to be endogenous to the presence of trimmers. 
 
It should be plain in this light that the practice of trimming creates highly 
unfortunate incentives, encouraging people to exaggerate the intensity of their views and 
in the process to stir up their adversaries. In the presence of trimmers, rights 
fundamentalists and believers in democratic primacy might characterize their own views 
strategically, attempting to move trimmers as they like. If they are successful, what seems 
                                                 
82 Robert Goodin, Possessive Individualism Again, 34 Political Studies 488, 489 (1976). 
83 See Kelman et al., supra note.  
84 Id. 
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in the abstract to be extreme, even outrageous, can be defined as the trimmers’ best 
option. Those who believe in the abortion right might characterize their view as 
supporting a flat ban on restrictions on the right to choose at any stage of the pregnancy; 
those who seek to protect commercial speech might urge that they want to give absolute 
protection to advertisements; those who seek to cabin the privacy right might deny the 
existence of any form of substantive due process.  
 
The trimmers’ approach explicitly lends itself to efforts at manipulation. To put it 
another way, the existence of trimming actually forces antagonists into a kind of 
prisoner’s dilemma or arms race -- even if they would not want, without trimming, to 
exaggerate the intensity of their own view. It is clear that trimmers have to be self-
conscious about this risk; they must take steps to guard against their own vulnerability. 
We might distinguish here between naïve trimmers, who are easily exploited by others, 
and sophisticated trimmers, who are alert to others’ strategic incentives in deciding 
whether to trim, and whose very alertness diminishes those incentives. Naïve trimmers 
are especially vulnerable here, and sophisticated ones may have to do a great deal of 
work to acquire the necessary information. 
 
2. Credibility constraints. There are, however, reasons to think that this fear may 
be overstated. If people characterize their position in an extreme way, they may well lose 
credibility, and even compromisers will be able to see through them. In experimental 
settings, jurors who are inclined to avoid the extremes are not infinitely manipulable; a 
credibility constraint limits their interest in finding a “golden mean.”85 And as we have 
seen, two can play the manipulation game. Suppose that the parties begin at –5 and +5, 
and the trimmer opts for 0. If the first party then moves to +10, hoping to shift the 
trimmer to +2.5, the second party will likely move to +10, restoring the status quo. Aware 
of the presence of trimmers, constitutional advocates will act similarly. 
 
Nonetheless, it remains true that compromisers can be manipulated. Because they 
are willing to sift and to scrutinize competing views, preservers are in a much better 
position. They should be able to see that strategic efforts sometimes yield positions that 
on reflection, have no appeal, and are not even sincerely held. Because of the risk of 
manipulation, along with the risk of error, preservative trimming has significant 
advantages over its compromise-oriented sibling. 
 
3. Arbitrary poles? Even if preservers can overcome the problem of manipulation, 
a related problem remains, which is arbitrariness. What the midpoint is depends on what 
the endpoints are, and if no independent justification is given for the endpoints, then there 
is no justification for the midpoint that is established by them. If the endpoints are 
                                                 
85 See Adrian Vermeule, Emergency Lawmaking After 9/11 and 7/7 (unpublished manuscript 2008). 
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arbitrary, then the midpoints are arbitrary as well. Preservers are in a position to correct 
this problem, because they will provide some scrutiny to the endpoints, ensuring that they 
contain something to preserve. Preposterous readings of the Constitution—as, for 
example, in the view that the First Amendment is nonjusticiable, or the President can 
protect national security however he sees fit—can be ruled out of bounds and hence as 
uninformative for purposes of trimming.  
 
The problem of arbitrariness seems harder for the compromiser to solve. But 
suppose that the trimmer believes that the distribution of views, in the relevant place, is 
no accident, and that it was produced by a set of mechanisms that ensure against arbitrary 
extremes. If the trimmer is concerned about the distribution of views on the Supreme 
Court, he might believe that political processes and professionalization ensure that the 
extremes are not genuinely arbitrary. If he does not believe that, he might consult the 
distribution of views within the federal courts as a whole, thinking that such views, at 
least, are likely to have an appropriate and reasonable mix. And if he does not believe 
that, he might consult the nation more generally, believing that in a society that is both 
free and democratic, the range of opinion is not a bad guide to what is reasonable. Of 
course preservers might be skeptical on this count.  
 
D. Lawless Trimmers 
 
Trimmers are influenced by a set of concerns whose relevance can be disputed, 
certainly in the domain of constitutional law and perhaps more generally. To be sure, 
trimming can reduce social conflict and the intensity of public outrage at judicial 
decisions. But trimming is often inferior to minimalism on this count, simply because 
trimmers will not decline to decide. And even if trimming is a good means of reducing 
outrage, why should judges care about public outrage86? Why should they refuse to issue 
the best interpretation of the Constitution, simply because the public would be angered by 
their decision? It is also true that trimming can be defended on strategic grounds. But 
should judges really be strategic? Should they attempt to persuade their colleagues by 
pressing for an interpretation of the Constitution that they do not endorse on principle? 
 
Perhaps the least controversial defense of trimming involves stare decisis. 
Sometimes judges will have to yield in their preferred interpretation in deference to past 
rulings. A judge might believe, on principle, that affirmative action does not create 
serious constitutional problems; this belief might be defended on originalist or other 
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grounds.87 Perhaps a judge will agree to trim in the sense that he will accept a ruling that 
is more moderate (given the existing poles) that he would prefer. But this defense is a 
limited one; it applies only in selected contexts in which stare decisis imposes an obstacle 
to selection of the favored approach. In some settings, no precedents require trimming; on 
the Court’s view, this was in fact the case in the domain of the Second Amendment.88 In 
other settings, the precedents are opaque, and judges can produce with their preferred 
interpretations without trimming. 
 
E. Political Trimmers 
 
On one view, trimming is a quintessentially political act. For all of the reasons 
given thus far, legislators and other policymakers might want to trim. Indeed, trimming is 
a pragmatic necessity in the political domain. This point raises a distinctive objection: 
Why shouldn’t judges simply defer to that form of trimming that emerges from politics? 
And if this question can be answered, another one remains: Why should we think that 
judges are good at trimming? 
 
It is true that if the political process produces ideal trimming, judges might defer. 
But what emerges from politics is sometimes challenged, plausibly, on constitutional 
grounds, and the constitutional complaint raises issues that might not have been 
adequately handled politically. If so, judges must decide what to do. A distinguished 
tradition holds that so long as the Constitution is unclear, judges should defer.89 But this 
view is highly controversial, and those who reject it might decide to trim. And even those 
who share this view must decide whether and when the Constitution is unclear; when this 
decision is made, trimming might be appropriate. To the objection that judges lack the 
relevant competence, the best response is that preservers attempt to obtain the 
information that would justify their judgments, and that compromisers act as they do 
precisely because of their own humility.  
 
F. Taking Stock 
 
These are formidable objections; they show that it would be foolish to trim in all 
times and all places. Trimming is best understood and justified as a decision procedure, 
suitable for some controversies, not as a characteristic or as a virtue suitable for 
constitutional law in general. But the objections should not be read for more than they are 
worth. They do not show that trimming has no place in politics or constitutional law. 
                                                 
87 See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 
Va L Rev 753 (1985); John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U Chi L 
Rev 723 (1974). 
88 District of Columbia v Heller, US (2008). 
89 See Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty (2006). 
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It is true that if judges are confident that the best interpretation of the Constitution 
forbids trimming, they should not trim. They should endorse the best interpretation. But 
suppose that judges are not confident which interpretation is best, and they seek to trim 
on the ground that trimming is a reasonable heuristic or defensible on epistemic grounds. 
If so, they should be expected to spend some time on the merits, to ensure that the result 
is defensible, that manipulation has not led them astray, and that a reasonable heuristic 
has not produced an error in the particular case. If they are convinced on those counts, 
they might do best to trim. The objections to trimming downplay the possibility that 
judges lack confidence on the right outcome, which might justify trimming, and the force 
of stare decisis, which might require trimming. It is true that once judges have decided to 
trim, they will not know what, exactly, to do; several possible approaches might count as 
trimming. But at least some approaches will be ruled out, and the range of attractive 
options will be defined. 
 
Because judges are specialists, they should not be mere compromisers, steering 
between the poles on the basis of their own ignorance. Some of the best arguments for 
trimming emphasize preservation of the most essential and deeply held components of 
competing points of view. Preservers can maintain that they trim, not out of cowardice, 
but on the ground that an investigation of the merits has persuaded them that the result of 
trimming is best. If the preservative approach also reduces public outrage, and reflects 
respect for the fundamental convictions of all involved, so much the better. And if 
trimming ensures that those with competing views do not feel humiliated or hurt, it is 
better still. 
 
IV. Minimalists vs. Trimmers 
 
Trimmers and minimalists seem to be jurisprudential cousins. Both groups seek to 
reduce the most intense social conflict and public outrage, and some of the arguments 
that support minimalism support trimming as well. No less than trimmers, minimalists 
seek to minimize the harm to losers, in a way that reflects a principle of civic respect. But 
while minimalists leave hard issues for another day, trimmers do no such thing; they 
reject the most expansive claims on behalf of rights while also recognizing rights of one 
or another sort. Minimalists celebrate the virtues of not deciding; trimmers want to 
decide. On the Supreme Court, the standard minimalist concurrence emphasizes the 
narrowness of a particular ruling; by contrast, the standard trimming concurrence stresses 
that the decision is more moderate than it might seem.90  
 
                                                 
90 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Lujan v 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 55 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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It should be clear that insofar as trimmers insist on clarity, they are not trimming. 
A consistent trimmer would think: As between clear decisions and not deciding, I will 
trim. In the abstract, it is not clear exactly what this means, but perhaps a consistent 
trimmer would decide some issues but not others. To keep distinctions clear, however, I 
will treat trimmers as committed to clarity, and minimalists as committed to small steps. 
Let us separate the two approaches and see what might be said on behalf of one or the 
other. 
 
A. Shallow and Narrow 
 
Minimalists are skeptical of rights fundamentalism, certainly when the Court is 
initially confronting difficult questions. They fear that expansive conceptions of rights 
may be confounded by unanticipated situations. Nor do minimalists have much 
enthusiasm for the idea of democratic primacy; they fear that a wholesale rejection of 
rights claims will prove embarrassing or worse in the future. Minimalists prefer small 
steps over large ones, and their preference operates along two distinct dimensions.91 
 
First, minimalists want to proceed in a way that is shallow rather than deep. In 
deciding what to do with a disputed constitutional provision, minimalists seek to leave 
the foundational issues undecided. They want to resolve a controversy over free speech or 
equal protection without resolving the deepest questions about the meaning of liberty and 
equality. They hope to produce incompletely theorized agreements—agreements on what 
to do amidst disagreements about exactly why to do it.92 Second, minimalists want to 
proceed in way that is narrow rather than wide. Confronted with a controversy over an 
affirmative action program or a restriction on the abortion right, they will seek to proceed 
without resolving other (hypothetical) controversies over (hypothetical) ones. Consider in 
this light Chief Justice John Roberts’s suggestion that one advantage of unanimous 
decisions from the Court is that unanimity leads to narrower rulings. In his words, “[t]he 
broader the agreement among the justices, the more likely it is a decision on the 
narrowest possible grounds.”93 The nine justices have highly diverse views, and if they 
are able to join a single opinion, that opinion is likely to be narrow rather than broad. 
This, in the Chief Justice’s view, is entirely desirable: “If it is not necessary to decide 
more to dispose of a case, in my view it is necessary not to decide more.”94 
 
Shallowness and narrowness are distinct from one another. We could imagine a 
decision that is shallow but wide. Consider, for example, the view that racial segregation 
                                                 
91 I discuss minimalism at length in Cass R. Sunstein, One Case At A Time (1999). 
92 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv L Rev 1733 (1995). 
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is always forbidden, unaccompanied by any deep account of what is wrong with racial 
segregation. We could also imagine a decision that is deep but narrow. Consider, for 
example, a ban on censorship of a particular political protest, accompanied by a 
theoretically ambitious account of the free speech principle, but limited to the particular 
situation in which censorship has been imposed. While a decision might be both shallow 
and narrow or both wide and deep, the two distinctions point in different directions. 
 
It is also important to see that both distinctions are ones of degree rather than 
kind. In most contexts, minimalists agree that courts should not decide cases without 
giving reasons, and reasons ensure at least some degree of depth. No one favors rulings 
that are limited to people with the same names or initials as those of the litigants before 
the Court. But among reasonable alternatives, minimalists show a persistent preference 
for the shallower and narrower options, especially in cases at the frontiers of 
constitutional law.  
 
B. Why Shallow? Why Narrow? 
 
To support that preference, minimalists invoke several considerations. As Chief 
Justice Roberts’ comments suggest, no consensus may be possible on a more ambitious 
ruling. The constraints of group decisionmaking may make minimalism inevitable, at 
least if the Court seeks a majority opinion with at least five signatories.  
 
In addition, judges often lack information that would justify confidence in a deep 
or wide ruling. Judges are neither philosophers nor historians, and an ambitious account 
of the foundations of some area of constitutional law, or the scope of some rule or 
principle, may strain judicial capacities. Of course constitutional method is crucial to a 
complete understanding of minimalism. If an originalist is to embrace minimalism, it 
might be on the ground that recovery of the original understanding presents difficult 
dilemmas, and it is best not to resolve those dilemmas until the need arises. Or suppose 
that a judge believes in a “moral reading” of the Constitution.95 Such a judge might 
embrace minimalism on the ground that the best understanding of “equal protection” 
requires courts to make exceedingly difficult moral judgments that are best left for 
another day. And because adjudication typically focuses judges on particulars, a wide 
ruling may force them to confront factual problems on which they lack relevant 
knowledge. Originalists, moral readers, and others might favor narrowness for that 
reason. 
 
There is an independent point. Minimalist rulings show a kind of respect to those 
with competing commitments on issues of principle and policy. If a ruling can command 
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consensus from people with fundamentally different views, it demonstrates respect to 
those people, and even shows them a degree of charity. To the extent that judges have a 
degree of diversity, the respect that they show one another extends to their fellow citizens 
as well. When judges embrace shallowness, minimalists seek to obtain some of the 
virtues of the “overlapping consensus” defended in accounts of political liberalism.96  
 
Like trimming, minimalism also has the advantage of quieting social controversy, 
certainly in the short-run and possibly in the long-run as well. A minimalist approach can 
therefore claim Burkean virtues insofar as it promotes incremental change.97 Suppose that 
the Court rules that a particular affirmative action program is valid, without ruling on 
other affirmative action programs, or that a particular form of discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation is invalid, without ruling that other forms of such discrimination are 
invalid. A narrow, shallow ruling ensures that losers do not lose the world. Minimalism 
maintains space for the losers to introduce their deepest convictions into future 
controversies. 
 
C. Deep, Wide, and Trim 
 
1. Against minimalism: on predictability and exporting costs. Trimmers will insist 
that these points do not make out an adequate defense of minimalism in all contexts. 
Sometimes it is best to settle on a course of action rather than to rest content with a series 
of small decisions. Minimalism might be easiest in the short-run, but in the long-run, it 
can be extremely destructive. It can be destructive in part because it exports the burdens 
of decision to others, in a way that might produce a great deal of trouble.98 However 
difficult a large decision may be, it may be best to make it, and sooner rather than later. 
Wide rulings can reduce the overall burdens of decision; they can also reduce the 
magnitude and number of mistakes. And if enduring social controversy is a legitimate 
cause for concern, then width might be defended on the ground that such controversy 
might be diminished, or muted, if the court settles a range of issues at once. 
 
Shallowness has its virtues, but sometimes it is best to resolve foundational issues. 
Some cases cannot be decided at all unless judges make a relatively large-scale decision 
about constitutional method or constitutional substance. Should judges embrace 
originalism? A dispute over the constitutional status of discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation may make it necessary to answer that question. Or consider the 
constitutional legitimacy of bans on same-sex marriage. Resolution of that question may 
require some ambitious judgments about the commitments that underlie a constitutional 
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guarantee. And even if depth is not, strictly speaking, required, judges may reasonably 
opt for it. They might conclude that they have enough understanding and experience to 
offer, right now, an ambitious account of the free speech or equal protection principle. If 
so, why should they hesitate? 
 
Alert to these objections, trimmers are eager to rule widely, in a way that will 
minimize confusion and conflict for the future. In especially sensitive areas, they insist 
that width will simultaneously create more stability and less controversy. They are 
perfectly comfortable with clear rules, laid down in advance. They are also willing to 
think hard about the foundations of constitutional law—about the appropriate 
constitutional method and about the grounds of one or another right. Trimmers refuse to 
“export” decisions to posterity. 
 
It should now be clear why and when minimalists and trimmers disagree. In a 
dispute involving affirmative action, a minimalist would be tempted to focus on the 
particular program, in a way that would leave a great deal undecided. A trimmer, by 
contrast, would make relevant distinctions, in a way that would introduce a high degree 
of predictability. Consider, as a prominent example of trimming, Justice Powell’s separate 
opinion in Bakke, concluding that quota systems are unacceptable but that educational 
institutions might legitimately use race as a “factor.”99 A committed minimalist would 
prefer a narrower decision, leaving undecided the question whether and when most 
affirmative action programs would be upheld. The minimalist would ask the trimmer: 
“Why decide issues that are not squarely presented?”  
 
The trimmer would respond: “The Supreme Court does not exist to issue fact-
specific rulings; one of its most important responsibilities is to offer clear guidance to 
lower courts and other institutions.”100 The same response might be offered in cases that 
involve the relationship between the First Amendment and the law of libel. Might it not 
be better to rule widely in that domain, so as to make the basic rules clear?  
 
2. Rules and standards, trimmers and minimalists. How might this kind of dispute 
be mediated? The issues are similar to those that divide advocates of open-ended 
standards from advocates of precise rules.101 Those who prefer standards are likely to be 
drawn to minimalism. Consider the “undue burden” standard in the law of abortion,102 an 
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approach that invites case-by-case rulings under a general concept whose content has not 
been specified in advance. Rule enthusiasts ask: Why should the Court proceed under the 
undue burden standard, instead of laying out clear rules that settle all or most issues in 
advance? Those who embrace standards are likely to respond that any effort to lay out 
rules would produce many blunders. If the Court attempted to specify, in advance, what 
amounts to an “undue burden,” it might itself face an undue burden, and in a way that 
would guarantee numerous errors as new situations arise. The conventional argument for 
standards, as opposed to rules, is that standards ensure flexibility for the future, thus 
reducing the magnitude and number of mistakes. 
 
On the other hand, enthusiasts for rules, such as Justice Scalia, might well object 
that an open-ended standard of this kind will create many problems.103 Rules are often 
better than standards, because they minimize the burden on future decisionmakers and 
also reduce mistakes on balance. True, a standard reduces the burden on the Court in the 
case at hand, but it does so at a high price, because it exports the burdens of decisions to 
future litigants and courts, in a way that might magnify costs on balance. And if the Court 
has a degree of confidence in its judgment, a wide rule might produce future errors, on 
balance, that a narrow one. Suppose, for example, that a flat ban on affirmative action is 
what the Constitution requires. If so, why proceed case-by-case? 
 
Much of the trimmer-minimalist debate involves the costs of decisions and the 
costs of errors. We can easily imagine situations in which either minimalism or trimming 
is best on those grounds. Trimmers tend to believe that their approach has the key 
advantages of rules: clear specification of outcomes in advance. Minimalists think that 
their approach has the key advantage of standards: flexibility in the face of an uncertain 
future. The choice between the two approaches depends on the context. We could easily 
imagine a situation in which minimalism should be preferred to trimming, because judges 
lack the information to justify width or breadth; consider novel first amendment questions 
involves new technologies.104 We could also imagine situations in which trimming should 
be preferred to minimalism, because the problem arises so frequently than uncertainty is 
intolerable; consider regulation of commercial advertising105 or sexually explicit 
speech.106  
 
We could also imagine difficult intermediate cases; consider the question of rights 
under the Second Amendment.107 On the one hand, minimalism might be defended on the 
ground that the Court has had little experience with that question and the array of 
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imaginable restrictions cannot be assessed in the context of a first encounter, or even a 
series of early encounters. Perhaps trimming would do too much too soon. But there are 
strong counterarguments. Suppose that the justices are fairly clear, even at an early stage, 
about the best understanding of the Second Amendment. If so, they might trim on the 
ground that no one benefits, and many lose, with protracted litigation over that 
meaning.108 The long experience of specifying the meaning of the abortion right,109 and 
the valid objections to affirmative action programs,110 point to the large costs, both 
economic and political, of a stream of case-by-case rulings, focused on particulars. If, as 
it seems, those costs would be high in the Second Amendment context, and if the Court 
has a clear sense, right now, of what it is thinking and doing, then it would be much better 
to trim. 
 
3. The path of the law; from minimalism to trimming? Over time, minimalist 
rulings might produce a regime of trimming. Return to the problem of affirmative action. 
Most of the Court’s early rulings were both narrow and shallow.111 The Court focused on 
particulars and left a great deal undecided. As the precedents accumulated, the law 
became increasingly clear. The clarity involved trimming, in the sense that the Court 
rejected rights fundamentalism (in the form a wholesale rejection of affirmative action 
programs) and democratic primacy (in the form of carte blanche for such programs).112 
 
 As cases accumulate, minimalism is highly likely to prove unstable. Width will 
increase: Shallow rulings with respect to obscenity, commercial advertising, and sex 
equality will eventually produce a degree of width. Depth is also likely: To decide 
whether one case is analogous to another, judges have to offer reasons, and as problems 
become more confusing and difficult, those reasons will become more ambitious.113  
 
But the movement from minimalism to trimming is not inevitable. Minimalist 
rulings might culminate in either rights fundamentalism or democratic supremacy. 
Consider the area of sex equality, which has culminated in something close to rights 
fundamentalism, in the form of a near-complete ban on formal sex discrimination.114 Or 
consider “rational basis” review in the domain of economic and social rights, in which a 
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series of narrow rulings has produced a regime of democratic primacy.115 Trimmers might 
reject minimalism not only on the ground that it leaves so much undecided, but also on 
the ground that it creates risks of slipping, by degrees, into one or another of the poles. 
 
Conclusion 
 
My purpose here has been to show that trimming is a pervasive practice in law 
and politics and to understand what might be said in its favor. Many trimmers are 
compromisers; they think that if we steer between the poles, we will probably do better 
than if we choose one or another of them. Such trimmers display a form of extremeness 
aversion, and under certain circumstances, the trimming heuristic makes a great deal of 
sense; it might even be justified on epistemic grounds. Other trimmers are preservers. 
They attempt to identify and to preserve what it is deepest, most intensely held, and best 
in competing positions.  
 
Trimmers of this kind can claim a degree of humility, because of their 
sympathetic attention to all sides. But to the extent that they are preservers, trimmers are 
willing to scrutinize the poles, not simply to observe them. For that reason, preservers are 
less subject to manipulation, and in the end, they have some reason for confidence that 
their decision is correct, not merely a way of splitting the difference. By their very nature, 
trimmers are motivated, in part, by a desire to reduce social conflict, to show a kind of 
civic respect, and to ensure that no side feels excluded, humiliated, or hurt. We can see 
here a tension between preservers who attend to what seems, in their independent 
judgment, to be most appealing in competing positions, and preservers who attend to 
what seems to be most deeply felt by those who hold those positions. 
 
It is possible, of course, that any form of trimming will produce a bad or even 
indefensible result. Any judgment on that point will depend on the appropriate theory of 
constitutional interpretation; originalists will often reject trimming, as will those who are 
committed to a moral reading of the Constitution. It is also true that trimmers can be 
manipulated; and if the poles are arbitrary, the trimming solution will be arbitrary too. In 
some domains, rights fundamentalism or democratic primacy is unquestionably better. 
But I hope that I have said enough to show that trimming is not only a pervasive practice 
but also an honorable one. In many areas, it is superior to the reasonable alternatives. 
 
 
Readers with comments should address them to: 
 
Professor Cass Sunstein 
 csunstei@uchiago.edu 
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